Tag Archive for 'automatic stay'

Debtors Not Allowed to Retain If Current

Most creditors are familiar with the phrase, “retain and pay”.  The bankruptcy code provides for certain treatment of debt, which is secured by personal property in Chapter 7 bankruptcies.  Specifically, the bankruptcy code provides that debtors must either reaffirm the existing debt, redeem the collateral or surrender the collateral (or assume or reject the lease.)  Prior to the amendments of the bankruptcy code in 2005, most debtors opted for the unwritten fourth option, “retain and pay.” 

However the 2005 amendment, “clearly provides that the debtor shall not only file a statement of intentions but also follow through with her express intent.”  If the intent is not followed through by the debtor in the statutory number of days, the automatic stay terminates and the property is no longer property of the estate. 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that the “retain and pay” option is no longer viable.  If a debtor opts for this unwritten alternative then the debtor will fail to meet his/her statutory obligation and the automatic stay will be terminated.  The mere termination of the automatic stay, however, is not enough to authorize the Creditor to repossess the collateral. 

In the case before the Ninth Circuit, the debtor’s failure to adhere to the code allowed for the stay’s termination.  Once the stay is terminated, the right to repossess the collateral then goes to the parties’ contract, in conjunction with state law to determine when the debtor has a default on the automobile loan and if that default allows repossession.  The debtor’s contract in the Ninth Circuit case contained an ipso facto clause that provided a default if the debtor filed for bankruptcy.

There is a bankruptcy code provision that, “generally renders unenforceable any contractual term which purports to create a default solely based on the commencement of a of a bankruptcy case.”(1)  However, the 2005 amendment overrides the provision that renders ipso facto clauses unenforceable when debtors fail to state an applicable intention and also fail to perform that intention.

Learning Points

  • Offer reaffirmation agreements (If a reaffirmation is offered but denied by the Bankruptcy Court then the creditor cannot repossess if debtors are current after bankruptcy)
  • Contracts should contain ipso facto clauses
  • Know your state law to make sure you can repossess the collateral
  • The above statutory provisions only apply to personal property

(1) Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Company, Appellate Case No. 08-60002 (September 15, 2009 9th Cir.)

Paying Back the Loss: No Loss Policies and Member Bankruptcy

by Robert Rutkowski, Partner and Bryan Kostura, Associate

Many credit unions have no loss policies. When a member causes the credit union a loss, the member either loses services (down to a share account and the right to vote at meetings) or, in the case of some state credit unions, the member is expelled. At times, a member will come to grips with financial reality and seek rehabilitation. In most cases, all that is necessary to get back in the good graces of the credit union is to pay back the loss the member caused in the first instance. Unfortunately this simple concept becomes exponentially more difficult when the member is in the midst of a bankruptcy.  During those instances a credit union needs to walk a fine line between educating the member on how restore member benefits and active debt collection.  When a member asks the credit union, “How can I become a member again?” or “How can I get my services back?”, the response is easy: “Eliminate the loss.”  However if not done properly this could result in the well meaning credit union violating the Federal Bankruptcy Court Stay. 

The purpose of the automatic stay is to give a debtor a brief reprieve from creditors and prevent one creditor from rushing to enforce a lien to the detriment of other creditors. The stay protects the debtor and his creditors by allowing the debtor to organize his affairs, and ensures that the bankruptcy procedures operate to provide an orderly resolution of all claims.

Notwithstanding this prohibition against the collection of discharged debts, a debtor may repay debts that would otherwise be dischargeable, either by entering into a formal reaffirmation agreement or by making voluntary payments in the absence of such an agreement.

After bankruptcy debtors may repay debts as they choose without being legally obligated in the event they later become unable to fulfill their intention.

While repayment induced by harassment or duress by a creditor is clearly prohibited, it is unclear to what extent a debtor’s repayment must be free from external influences. One meaning of “voluntary” would require that the repayment be spontaneous, that is, induced by nothing other than the debtor’s own conscience. On the other hand, “voluntary” is often used to refer to actions resulting from one’s interest in experiencing gain or avoiding loss. Under this interpretation, voluntariness would be determined from the totality of circumstances surrounding the repayment.

With respect to credit unions specifically, courts have held that the mere cancellation of the debtor’s membership privileges, such as maintaining an interest-bearing share account for the debtor, or maintaining a checking account for the debtor, is not a withdrawal of privileges unique to union membership and therefore not so valuable as to be found coercive. However, where the creditor combines the cancellation with certain acts that result in the repayment of a discharged debt, those acts may violate the Bankruptcy Code.

Courts have discussed acts that go beyond mere cancellation. For example, a credit union violates the stay by terminating a debtor’s membership, refusing to accept his mortgage payments, and subsequently declaring the mortgage in default. Although terminating the debtor’s membership was not a coercive act, refusing mortgage payments and foreclosing on the mortgage was coercive.

Courts have consistently held that the mere cancellation of a debtor’s credit union membership, although perhaps against public policy to some extent, does not violate the automatic stay or the discharge injunction of (a) as an act to collect a dischargeable or discharged debt. When credit unions have a policy of terminating membership privileges to any member who caused it a loss, courts have held that this does not violate the automatic stay.

Courts have discussed whether notification of the credit union’s policy amounts to coercion. The consensus among the courts that have examined this issue is that it is not a violation. The rational is that nothing in the bankruptcy code requires a creditor to do business with a debtor; therefore, simply notifying a debtor of its policy is not a violation.

In summary, actions taken by a creditor in the process of seeking voluntary repayment of a post-petition indebtedness violates the bankruptcy code only if the action (1) could reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the debtor’s determination as to whether to repay, and (2) is contrary to what a reasonable person would consider to be fair under the circumstances. Further, mere notice of a stop loss policy by a credit union does not violate Bankruptcy law, so long as the notice is not coupled with coercive acts.

If you have further questions or require additional explanation related to this topic Robert Rutkowski, Partner of WWR’s Credit Union Department or Bryan Kostura, Associate with WWR’s Bankruptcy Department would be happy to talk with you.

Protect Your Mortgage Lien: Dealing with Ohio’s Dower Interest

The Ohio legal principle of “first in time, first in right” applies to mortgage liens as well as dower interest as indicated in a recent ruling in the Northern District of Ohio(1).  The bankruptcy court states that, “if a couple is married before property is mortgaged, the dower interest has priority over the mortgage lien.”  Usually, dower interest is not an issue when it comes to the creditor holding the mortgage, as the non-title holding spouse signs the mortgage to release dower interest at the same time the title holding spouse is executing the mortgage.  The release of dower interest acts as a subordination document rendering the dower interest secondary to the mortgage lien. 

If the dower interest is acquired before the mortgage lien and there is no signature releasing it, the dower interest will hold priority. Without a dower interest release, the dower interest is entitled to priority in proceeds from the sale of the property.  From a foreclosure perspective, the dower interest will receive payment after taxes are paid and before the creditor holding the mortgage claim is paid.  From a bankruptcy perspective, the trustee will want to object to any motion for relief from the automatic stay and for abandonment in order retain the dower interest on behalf of the bankruptcy estate.

The bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Ohio ruled that the value of the dower interest must be calculated on the full fair market value of the property.  In this particular case, the bankruptcy court noted that the dower interest value was significant and could provide funds for distribution to unsecured creditors.  The bankruptcy court went further to deny the creditor’s request for the trustee to abandon his interest in the property due to the significant dower interest value.

What does this ruling mean for creditors?

1. Trustees will be scrutinizing dower rights to see if there is any value, if applicable.  Such scrutiny and objection will result in a delay from receiving relief from stay and abandonment if you hold a mortgage claim on the property, or a general delay in administration of the estate if you are a general creditor.

2. Motion for relief from stay and abandonment will be denied or only relief from stay will be granted, providing a drastic delay in foreclosure proceedings as certain common pleas courts require both relief from stay and abandonment before a foreclosure can take place.

3. Creditors should review their documentation to make sure procedures are in place to deal with those states that have dower interests.

(1) In re Rosario, Case no. 08-14392 (N.D. Ohio March 9, 2009)